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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Aim and Context 
The construction of High Speed Railways often fac-
es an increasing number of difficulties because of 
the opposition of the local population, the environ-
mental activists and similar ideological groups 
(Setola, 2015). Then, the aim of a security assess-
ment must be to identify the optimal location for the 
construction sites, to minimize the potential negative 
consequences of protests on the population, the 
workers, the businesses and the costs of the con-
struction project. The topic was addressed only re-
cently in the literature. In (Sadi and El-Rayes, 2010) 
it is analyzed how to include the security issue in the 
planning of construction site layouts. The problem is 
treated in (Li et al. 2015) as a bilevel and multi-
object optimization problem. An overview about 
construction site security is reported in (Arata, 2006) 
while (Boba and Santos, 2008) analyses the phe-
nomenon of thefts inside construction sites. 
In this paper, we illustrate a methodology devel-
oped for the optimization of the location of the con-
struction sites for the 57km tunnel of the high speed 
railway Lyon-Turin. This €8 billion mining engi-
neering project has been suffering a strong opposi-
tion, especially on the Italian side, which has caused 
more than 1,000 injured in the last 4 years, a consid-
erable increment in the costs and a large delay on the 
time scheduling of the project.  
During the investigation phase for the approval of 
the final project, the Italian Government has re-
quested a detailed risk assessment of the 10 planned 
construction sites, regarding to safety and security. It 
also asked to consider alternative locations to im-
prove the safety of workers and population. 
To perform such assessment, we adopted the An-
alytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1990, Zio, 
1996), properly tailored to manage the specific secu-
rity issues. To identify the most secure solution, we 
compared different construction site configurations, 
that have been evaluated with regard to how much 
the site is considered a valuable target by the oppo-
nents and to what the potential consequences of an 
attack might be.  
The methodology is used to perform a compara-
tive analysis of the different configurations, with the 
aim to identify which are the most suitable ones. The 
evaluation is made quite hard by the presence of 
several feasibility constraints in the possible alterna-
tive construction sites. Moreover, the establishment 
of a new site would impact the other existing ones, 
in terms of work allocation, organization and time-
scheduling. 
To systematically manage the evaluation process, 
a risk analysis framework has been adopted to ex-
clude inadequate solutions at the early stages and to 
focus the design process on those solutions consid-
ered the most suitable. Obviously, at the early stages 
only qualitative information is available, whereas in 
the latter stages more detailed information and quan-
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titative data are used. Thus, the security assessment 
framework must be able to manage different levels 
of granularity and details.   
For this reason, the proposed framework starts 
modelling the different elements involved in the as-
sessment using qualitative information (soft data), 
which are subsequently decomposed in tangible 
quantities (hard data), following an approach devel-
oped for software engineering requirements 
(Donzelli and Setola, 2007). 
In this paper, we illustrate the methodological 
framework adopted for the security assessment of 
the sites. For obvious reasons, no details are provid-
ed about the sites and all data have been convenient-
ly camouflaged.   
1.2 Paper Organization  
The paper is arranged as follows: in Section 2, the 
Lyon-Turin high speed railway project is briefly de-
scribed, together with the related security problems 
occurred in the last few years. The methodology 
adopted for the security assessment is described in 
Section 3, while Section 4 shows some results, and 
some closing comments are collected in Section 5.     
 
2 LYON-TURIN HIGH SPEED RAILWAY 
PROJECT 
2.1 The project 
The construction of the high speed railway Lyon-
Turin is part of the Mediterranean Corridor, one of 
the nine Trans-European transport Networks (TEN-
T) lunched by the European Commission with the 
aim to improve European mobility (see Figure 1 and 
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure_
en for more details).  Specifically, the Mediterranean 
Corridor is going to be about 3,000 km long, cross-
ing the Southern Europe from West (Spain) to East 
(Russia) through France, Italy, Slovenia, Croatia and 
Hungary.  
Figure 1: TEN-T Corridors. 
 
The Mediterranean Corridor will cross the Alps 
from Lyon to Turin. As the old 6 km Frejus tunnel 
lies 1,000m above sea level with a grade profile up 
to 33‰, there is the need to replace it with a new 
one.  As showed in Figure 2, the new tunnel is going 
to be 57km long and it will connect Susa (Italy) to St 
Jean-de-Maurienne (France) at an altitude of about 
500m and with a maximum grade profile of 12,5 ‰. 
Trains will be able to operate at speeds up to 220 
km/h. The tunnel has been estimated to cost €8 bil-
lion and it is expected to be fully operational by 
2030. Once finished, it will be the longest railway 
tunnel in the world. 
 
Figure 2. Profiles of old and new tunnels 
 
The tunnel construction will be carried out by TELT 
SAS, a company specifically established by the 
French and the Italian governments for the construc-
tion and the management of the tunnel. All the pre-
liminarily geognostic tests have been performed and 
at the end of 2016 the French and Italian parliaments 
approved the agreement to start constructing. 
2.2 Opposition to the project 
The project has suffered a strong opposition from 
the local population, especially on the Italian side, 
because it is considered unnecessary, useless, too 
expensive and dangerous for the environment. This 
opposition has been partially led by extremist 
groups, which tried to obtain large visibility and au-
thority under the “NoTav” flag. These groups pro-
moted a violent opposition against the tunnel, ar-
ranged many sabotages and attacks against the 
construction sites and the companies involved in the 
construction activities. In the period from 2012 to 
2016, about 200 violent attacks against the site La 
Maddalena (the Italian site of the geognostic test 
tunnel) have occurred. These attacks have caused 
more than 1,000 injuries in law enforcement offic-
ers, a large delay in the construction activities, a 
strong concern among the population (the tourism in 
the area dropped) and they have forced the adoption 
of an increased number of security measures for the 
construction site (with a significant cost increase).  
2.3 The aim of the security assessment  
During the process for the final approval of the tun-
nel, because of such violent opposition, the Italian 
Government has asked for a detailed analysis of the 
security risks for all the planned construction sites, 
and to consider alternative locations for those sites 
to reduce security risks.  This request was quite rele-
vant because originally security issues were not tak-
en into account in choosing the construction site lo-
cations; it was only considered the maximum 
efficiency in the operation of the construction activi-
ties. 
The goal of the security assessment has been to 
compare the risks of the already planned sites with 
those of the alternative locations, with the aim of 
identifying the best configurations, i.e. those that 
minimize the security risks both for population, 
workers and business (operation) continuity.  
The assessment and comparison tasks have been 
made difficult by the several constraints to be con-
sidered to identify alternative locations for the con-
struction sites. Moreover, introducing a new site im-
pacts the other existing ones, with respect to work 
activities, allocation, organization and time-
scheduling. This implies the re-design of the layout 
of all sites, with consequent changes in the whole 
security assessment. This entails a global considera-
tion of the overall “construction sites configuration”, 
i.e. considering globally the security issues of all the 
involved construction sites (and the logistic aspects 
related to their operations).  
To this end, as illustrated more in detail in the 
next section, the security risk of each construction 
site is modelled in terms of its “sensibility” and the 
potential “consequences” of a sabotage/attack. These 
features are iteratively decomposed, on the base of 
the available information, into elementary and 
measurable quantities parameters. The different 
quantities are aggregated using the Analytic Hierar-
chy Process (AHP) methodology to estimate the lev-
el of security risk of each site. Moreover, to evaluate 
the security risk of each construction site configura-
tion the values of the different sites in the configura-
tion are aggregated considering the time duration of 
their operations too. 
To focus the analysis effort only on the most suit-
able configuration solutions, an iterative process has 
been adopted to discard the unfeasible configura-
tions at the early stages.  
3 THE METHODOLOGY  
 
3.1 The proposed approach 
The analysis of the factors involved in the security 
risks to which a construction site is exposed is struc-
tured by the AHP in a top-down formulation. In the 
first stage, the analysis is performed using abstract 
and qualitative properties of the construction sites, 
which are decomposed at a later stage into their 
measurable constituents. Indeed, at the early stage of 
the analysis of an alternative construction site the in-
formation and data available are very limited, i.e. in-
formation and data on the geographic location of the 
area, with little details about perimeters, layouts, 
working and operation tasks, etc. At the same time, 
as mentioned above, introducing such a new site in 
the overall configuration modifies the organization 
of some other sites in the configuration and produces 
a limited availability of preliminary information 
(e.g. “the presence of this new site will reduce a lit-
tle the activities in the other sites”, etc.). 
Since it is impossible to design or re-design in detail 
the layout of all the potential sites in all the possible 
configurations, the security assessment is performed 
iteratively to identify and discard the infeasible solu-
tions.    
The level of security risk associated to any site is 
modelled in terms of (see Figure 4): 
 Sensibility. which provides a measure of the belief 
that someone may perform a sabotage/attack 
against the site.  
 Impact: which provides an estimation of the pos-
sible consequences of a sabotage/attack.   
As mentioned in the introduction of this paper we 
illustrate the approach used to estimate the sensibil-
ity of each site. This quantity is decomposed into: 
 Attractiveness. How much the site is considered 
valuable as a possible target from the opponents. 
In other words, the attractiveness quantifies the 
benefits that the enemy can achieve by finalizing 
the action against the site. 
 Vulnerability. How much easy (or hard) is to ac-
complish a sabotage/attack against the site. It 
depends on the intrinsic characteristics of the site 
and on the attacker's technical capabilities. 
These parameters depend both on macro-scale da-
ta, i.e. on characteristic of the area where the site is 
located, and on the peculiarities of the site, i.e. ex-
tension, morphology, activities, etc. Notice that for 
the problem at hand the experts consider the vulner-
ability more relevant than the attractiveness (>). 
We asked to the experts to provide a grade for 
each parameter for all the construction sites using a 
five-level scale (LOW=1, MEDIUM-LOW, MEDI-
UM, MEDIUM-HIGH and HIGH=5).  
Obviously, at this level of abstraction a rough es-
timation is given. To improve the accuracy these 
quantities have been decomposed into their macro-
parameters. More specifically, the attractiveness has 
been split up into the following seven parameters: 
 Symbolic value of the site. The sites directly relat-
ed to the base tunnel have a greater symbolic 
value than the deposit sites. In the same way, the 
sites located in a particular area might be per-
ceived as more valuable than others. 
 Visibility. Some sites are highly visible both from 
population and media point of view; the visibil-
ity has a strong impact on the attractiveness of a 
site because the effect of an action performed 
against a visible site will be emphasized by the 
media. 
 Expected damage. The larger is the foreseen level 
of impact of a sabotage/attack the more a site is 
attractive. The level of impact taken into account 
in this case is the level assumed by the opponent 
point of view (which is usually different from 
the effective level of damage). 
 Absence of collateral damage. Since opponents 
wish to have the support of the population they 
are very careful not to damage the population it-
self – and in some cases workers too. 
 Accessibility. The more a site is easy to reach (and 
to run away from) the more it is attractive. 
 Context. Some areas of the valley are historically 
characterized by a strong feeling against the tun-
nel construction and this feeling resulted in vio-
lent movements. In these areas opponents find a 
broad ideological and logistic support. 
 Isolation. If a site is located in a remote area, any 
illegal action is easy to perform because of the 
lack of control.     
These parameters largely depend on macro-scale 
data so they can be easily estimated at very early de-
sign stage too, with the help of experts using the 
mentioned five-level scale.  
Notice that since the goal of the procedure is not 
to provide an absolute value of the risk associated to 
each site but to perform a comparative analysis of 
the different solutions, the experts can easily provide 
a good estimation of the different parameters using 
the site La Maddalena as reference.    
 
Figure 3. Relative relevance of attractiveness parameters.  
 
To compare the relevance of the different param-
eters using the AHP approach we asked to the ex-
perts to express the relative importance of any cou-
ple of parameters using a five-level scale: not rele-
vant at all (<<, i.e. 1/5), slightly relevant (<, i.e. 1/3), 
equally relevant (=, i.e. 1), very relevant (>, i.e. 3), 
extremely relevant (>>, i.e. 5). The results are col-
lected in Figure 3.  
We are able to better define the estimation of the 
site attractiveness combining the value of the pa-
rameters resulted by applying the AHP method. This 
new estimation overwrites the previous rough one. 
The parameters that characterize the vulnerability of 
a site are more related to the characteristics of the 
construction site, so we need to consider an iterative 
process. Hence in the first stages they are evaluated 
on the base of experts’ opinions and then progres-
sively replaced with numerical values calculated on 
the basis of design data and other information. After 
that the values of the different quantitative factors 
are elaborated following the AHP methodology. 
Specifically, to estimate the vulnerability we con-
sider that vulnerability of a site depends on its: 
 Attackability. How easily the site can be attacked 
by the opponents. 
 Defensibility. How much the site configuration fa-
cilitates the protection.  
This latter is considered more relevant (>) than 
attackability and both the parameters are assessed by 
the experts for each site. To have better defined es-
timations both parameters are decomposed as fol-
lows.  
The attackability is split into:  
 Accessibility. The easier a site is to reach or to run 
away from (especially by vehicles) the more at-
tractive it will be for sabotages/attacks.  
 Complexity of the construction activities within 
the site. The more construction activities are 
complex, the easier is for the opponents to ex-
ploit the site’s vulnerabilities.  
These parameters, when the relative information is 
available, are further decomposed as follows: 
Accessibility 
o Number of roads accessible to vehicles 
o Number of pedestrian paths 
o Number of accesses to the site 
o Morphology of the surrounding (e.g. the 
construction site is on the top of a hill or 
at the bottom of a valley)  
o Characteristics of the natural surrounding 
(i.e. dense vegetation instead of grass-
land) 
o Presence of natural barriers (e.g. rivers, 
cliff walls, etc.) 
Complexity of the construction activities within the 
site. 
o Site Logistics: the presence of several op-
erating employees and vehicles in case of 
complex activities may facilitate the op-
ponents in the making of sabotag-
es/attacks.   
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o Number of employees that operate in the 
site. 
o Number of vehicles that operate in the site. 
o Number of accesses per day: in case of a 
high number of accesses both from em-
ployees and vehicles, a fast access con-
trol is needed. 
On the other side the Defensibility is decomposed 
in:  
o Perimeter length: a long perimeter is more 
complex and expensive to protect than a 
short one. 
o Perimeter morphology: an irregular perim-
eter is hard to control. This can be further 
decomposed into: 
o Site extension: the larger a site is, the hard-
er its control is. 
o Site morphology: irregular altimetry, inside 
and outside the site, reduces the visibil-
ity, facilitating the opponents. 
o Presence, of dominant positions that can be 
used by the opponents as a vantage point 
to monitor the activities, through objects 
against the site or to perform other kinds 
of sabotages/attacks.  
Some of the above-mentioned parameters are al-
ready measurable quantities, so they are properly 
converted in a 0-5 scale (in which 5 is associated 
with the maximum value with respect to all the sites 
in all the configuration). The others are further re-
fined in order to decompose them into measurable 
quantities (we neglect these details for security rea-
sons). 
The whole process is illustrated in Figure 4. The 
high level of hierarchy in the decomposition of the 
vulnerability is due to the difficulties of the experts 
to compare heterogeneous quantities, Indeed, we 
need to aggregate the different elements into more 
abstract quantities, which become easier to be com-
pared (a different solution to overcome this problem 
is to consider AHP with incomplete information as 
proposed in (Oliva et al, 2016).   
 
4 RESULTS 
The proposed procedure has been used to assess 
the ten construction sites foreseen in the nominal 
project. The results are reported in the Figure 5.  
The analysis emphasizes that there are two sites 
with high levels of sensibility and impact (red zone) 
and other two sites close to the border between the 
yellow and the red zones. Therefore, these four sites 
are very critical from the security point of view.   
Several alternative solutions have been analyzed 
for reducing the security risk. In Figure 6, we report 
the best solution, that contains eleven sites (obtained 
introducing two new sites and removing one of the 
planned sites1). Specifically, thanks to a complete 
re-arrangement of the construction activities in all 
the sites, there is a considerable reduction of the se-
curity risk level of each site. By now, only one site 
is in the red zone of the graph (with a significant re-
duction of its sensibility and impact with respect to 
previous configurations) and no one of the sites 
close to the border between the red and the yellow 
zones.  
 
 
Figure 5. Results of the assessment for the ten sites that consti-
tute the nominal configuration.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper describes the approach developed by the 
authors to identify the best location for major works  
construction sites considering the security issue. 
This approach is based on an iterative process; for 
each site the security-relevant parameters are pro-
gressively decomposed from abstract and qualitative 
data into measurable ones.  
The analysis of the factors involved in the securi-
ty risks to which a construction site is exposed is 
structured by the AHP in a top-down formulation. In 
the first stage, the analysis is performed using ab-
stract and qualitative properties of the construction 
sites, which are decomposed at a later stage into 
their measurable constituents. 
The level of security risk associated to any site is 
modelled in terms of Sensibility and Impact, decom-
posed in several further indicators evaluated in the 
following phases of the mentioned iterative process, 
as described in Section 3. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Notice that each symbol is related to a peculiar site. 
 
Figure 6. Results of the risk assessment for the optimal con-
figuration. 
 
The procedure has been used to identify the best 
locations for the construction sites of the new Lyon-
Turin high speed railway tunnel.  
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Figure 4. Decomposition of the sensibility parameter.    
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